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Abstract. Security protocols often use randomization to achieve probabilistic non-determinism. This
non-determinism, in turn, is used in obfuscating the dependence of observable values on secret data.
Since the correctness of security protocols is very important, formal analysis of security protocols
has been widely studied in literature. Randomized security protocols have also been analyzed using
formal techniques such as process-calculi and probabilistic model checking. In this paper, we consider
the problem of validating implementations of randomized protocols. Unlike previous approaches which
treat the protocol as a white-box, our approach tries to verify an implementation provided as a black
box. Our goal is to infer the secrecy guarantees provided by a security protocol through statistical
techniques. We learn the probabilistic dependency of the observable outputs on secret inputs using
Bayesian network. This is then used to approximate the leakage of secret. In order to evaluate the
accuracy of our statistical approach, we compare our technique with the probabilistic model checking
technique on two examples: crowds protocol and dining crypotgrapher’s protocol.
1 Introduction
A number of randomized protocols have been proposed to ensure the secrecy of certain facts which
must not be disclosed while some consequences of these facts have to be made observable. There could
be several motivations for this secrecy such as individual privacy expectations or negotiations among
mutually untrusted parties. For example, a voting machine would be expected to retain the anonymity
of the voter while recording his vote and hence, the vote recording protocol would do some periodic
random reordering of votes. Other more involved examples of randomized protocols are contract-signing
protocol, privacy-preserving auction protocol and crowds protocol for routing messages. These protocols
achieve this hiding of secret information by using randomization to obfuscate the relation between the
secret data and the observable data. The goal of these protocols is to make it difficult for an attacker
to learn the secret from the observable data.
Since the correctness of security protocols is very important, formal verification of security protocols has
been widely studied in literature. Deterministic protocols can be modeled as labeled transition systems
and formal techniques such as model checking can be used for state exploration to verify properties
expressed in temporal logic. Randomized security protocols can be modeled as discrete time Markov
chains (DTMCs) or Markov decision processes (MDPs) and probabilistic model checking techniques can
be used to verify properties expressed in stochastic temporal logic which is temporal logic augmented
with probabilities.
A key issue with these randomized protocols is that their implementations can be imperfect. For ex-
ample, in the Dining Cryptographers protocol [10], the coins being used by the cryptographers might
be biased which might reveal probabilistic information about which cryptographer paid. Another ex-
ample is that in the Crowds Protocol [18], the crowd might be infested by moles which provide their
observation to the adversary. This might be used by an adversary to guess the sender of a message with
greater accuracy.
The goal of this project is to develop a statistical technique for analyzing the protocol implementa-
tions and quantifying the anonymity loss. While trying to validate the implementation of the security
protocols, we make the following assumptions.
1. The implementation is not created in an hostile environment and any implementation error is only
an unintended bug such as use of poor pseudo-random generators. If the implementation is hostile,
it can contain bugs which can not be easily detected by random sampling. For example: a crowds
protocol implementation which would fail to anonymize for a particular path would not necessarily
be detected as erroneous by our technique.
2. The implementation might have other vulnerabilities which make it possible to compromise it. Our
analysis is limited to secrecy guarantees provided by the implementation and not to whether it is
vulnerable to attacks.
3. The quality of the source of randomization while testing is the same as when the implementation is
deployed. If the source of randomization deteriorates and becomes more deterministic, the secrecy
guarantees checked during testing will no longer hold true.
We assume that the implementation of the protocol is provided to us as a black-box. The reason we
consider the implementation as a black box is because unlike protocols which are public, implementa-
tions could be an executable binary or a hardware implementation or an IP core and we would be able
to check the implementation’s correctness only by observing its inputs and outputs.
Our approach to learn probabilistic dependencies is inspired from the work in reverse engineering
genetic networks [17,14,21] where a similar problem exists. Molecular and cellular processes form com-
plex stochastic feedback networks where the regulatory molecules that control expression of genes are
themselves controlled by other genes. Hence, an important problem is to reconstruct functional net-
work architectures from the observed time series of gene expression data. This requires discovering
probabilistic dependencies among the different genes. In verifying an implementation of a randomized
protocol, we can obtain a number of sample traces (over both secret and observed values) of its working,
and then use that to construct dependency of observed values from secret values.
Once the probabilistic dependency of the observable values on the secret data has been learnt statisti-
cally from the traces of the randomized protocol implementation, the task of measuring the information
leaked by the security protocol is similar to the channel capacity estimation problem. We compare the
estimates obtained by our technique with that from probabilistic model checking to validate its accu-
racy. We use the two examples1 used in [5] - dining cryptographers and crowds for comparison.
The novel contributions made in this paper are -
1. This is a first completely statistical approach to verifying probabilistic security protocols and does
not require any modeling of protocol as DTMC or MDP. This technique requires only sampling
over the traces obtained by running the protocol implementation. We are not aware of any existing
black-box testing approach for verifying security protocols.
2. We experimentally compare our technique with probabilistic model checking.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss related works. We present our
statistical approach in Section 3. The experimental analysis of our approach is presented in Section 4.
We mention some limitations of our work in Section 5 and conclude by identifying some future work
in Section 6.
2 Related Works
Characterization of secrecy loss in cryptographic protocols as channel capacity and mutual information
has also been well studied in literature. Several efforts have also been made towards validation of
randomized security protocols. In this section, we briefly summarize some of the relevant work.
Secrecy provided by protocols is measured in terms of the entropy of the observable data in [20]. This
work uses the lack of information with the attacker as the notion of anonymity or secrecy. Thus, it
implicitly assumes uniform distribution of the secret data.
An alternative approach [15] is to consider the mutual information between the observed data and the
secret data. This is referred as the channel capacity where the secrecy leak is modeled as the covert
channel due to the imperfect nature of the security protocol. Consequently, this measure depends only
on the protocol and not on the distribution of the secrets. Maximizing the channel capacity with respect
to input distribution can be used as a measure of worst case secrecy loss.
1 models used for probabilistic model checking in [5] are available online at http://www.prismmodelchecker.org/
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Different notions of quantitative information flow [7,8] have been developed in context of analyzing
information flow in a program. Many of these techniques assume some distribution (mostly uniform)
on the secret input space and only provide guarantees for such input spaces. Clarkson, Myers and
Schnieder [6] define information leaked as the difference between a prior guess of the attacker and the
posterior belief of the attacker after the observation has been made. For example, an attacker could
have some probabilistic model for the relation between secret F and observable data G as well as some
guess about the secret facts F . After observing G, he can revise his guess. The incremental gain in
knowledge of the attacker is defined to be the information flow from secret to observable data. The
metric used to measure the difference in probability distribution in this work is the Kullback-Leibler
distance.
Another approach based on hypothesis testing is described by Di Pierro et al [16]. Here attacks are
seen to be like experiments conducted by an attacker to validate his hypothesis about the secret or to
revise them. A similar approach by Charzikokolakis et al [4] considers the problem of calculating errors
of randomized protocols as finding how well can an attacker estimate the maximum a posteriori rule
given that a priori distribution is not known. They characterize this as Bayes risk.
Two existing approaches for verifying randomizing protocols that are most similar to our work are
probabilistic variant of pi-calculus [9,3] and probabilistic model checking [2]. We use probabilistic model
checking as comparison point in our experimental evaluation. Probabilistic model checking [13] is an
extension of model checking [1] which was initially developed as a formal technique for finding bugs
in circuits. It is used to model and validate systems which exhibit stochastic behaviour. Generally,
probabilistic systems are specified as DTMCs or MDPs and the conditional probability of an observable
value given a secret data is computed as the probability of reaching some state in the formal model.
A major problem with application of this technique to verify implementations of randomized protocol
is that one needs to abstract the implementation into a formal model. Even if the implementation is
available as a source code or hardware design, it is non-trivial to derive the formal model from it.
Errors might be overlooked or new errors might be introduced in derivation of the formal model from
the implementation. In case, the implementation is only available as a black box, this technique can
not be used.
3 Statistical Approach
In this section, we present our statistical approach to analysis of randomized protocols. We start with
some preliminaries on information theory which is used in the rest of the section. We also briefly
summarize the existing work on measuring loss of secrecy as channel capacity or mutual information
to formally define our problem. We then show how we can use traces of the protocol implementation
to learn probabilistic dependency graph between the secrets and the observable data. This dependency
graph is basically a Bayesian network. We describe how we can learn the structure and parameters of
the network from the traces and then, show how to estimate the mutual information from the learnt
parameters.
Randomized Protocol
Secret
Random Number Generator
Observable
Fig. 1. Randomized Protocol Input/Output
In our approach, the randomized protocol to be analyzed can be viewed to be an information channel
similar to Figure 1. It takes two inputs - the secret data S and a set of one or more random numbers
R. These are processed to output an observable event O. The goal of the randomized protocol is to
ensure that it is difficult to infer the value of secret data from the observable events. Thus, our task is
to characterize how much information about S is leaked through O.
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3.1 Information Theory
Analysis of probabilistic systems relies on a number of tools and concepts used in information theory
to reason about the uncertainty of some data and the amount of information it can reveal about some
other data which was used in its computation.
An important notion borrowed from information theory is that of entropy. If X is a random variable,
then H(X) denotes its entropy and is defined as H(X) = −
∑
x∈X
p(x)log p(x) where X denotes the
domain of X. Entropy measures the uncertainty of the random variable. If log is taken with base 2,
entropy is also the measure of number of bits required to express X. Intuitively, if k bits are used
to encode a variable, then it can take 2k possible values assuming an uniform distribution. Thus, the
entropy is measure of the information content in X.
Another important notion is that of relative entropy between two probability distributions p and q. It
is defined as the Kullback-Leibler distance D(p||q) =
∑
x∈X
p(x)log p(x)/q(x). This distance is always
positive and is 0 if p = q. Intuitively, it is measure of the expected difference in the number of bits
required to code samples from p when using a code based on p, and when using a code based on q. In
coding theory, KL divergence is interpreted as the expected extra message-length per datum that must
be communicated if a code that is optimal for a wrong distribution q is used, compared to using a code
based on the true distribution p.
A related concept is that of conditional entropy of two random variables X and Y . The conditional
entropyH(X|Y ) isH(X|Y ) = −
∑
y∈Y
p(y)
∑
x∈X
p(x|y)log p(x|y) measures the uncertainty ofX after
Y is observed. It summarizes the extra information in X which is not inferred from Y . It is maximum
when H(X|Y ) = H(X), in which case the uncertainty of X remains unchanged on observing Y . It is
minimum at 0 if there is deterministic function f(y) = x.
The change in the uncertainty of X on observing Y is provided by the difference between entropy of
X and the conditional entropy of X and Y . This quantity is called the mutual information which is
defined as I(X;Y ) = H(X) − H(X|Y ). A little algebra shows that I(X;Y ) = I(Y ;X). This is the
main quantity of interest to us.
3.2 Channel Capacity
Randomized protocols can be viewed as a lossy communication channel [5] from S to O and can be rep-
resented as a tuple 〈S ,O, p(·|·)〉 where p is the conditional probability distribution of observation given
the secret. The mutual information between S and the observation O defines the flow of information
across this channel. This definition of information flow does not enforce any probability distribution
over the secrets S . The maximum capacity is defined to be the maximum flow possible across this
channel. Thus, channel capacity of the randomized protocol is maxp(s) I(S ;O), that is,
maxp(s)I(S ;O) = maxp(s){H(S)−H(S|O)} = maxp(s)
∑
s
∑
o
[p(s)p(o|s)log p(s|o)/p(s)]
where s and o are different values taken by the secret and observable variables.
The above expression which is maximized over p(s) is over two parameter distributions p(o|s) and
p(s|o).
We note that algebraic manipulation would not decrease the degree of freedom of this expression and
it would always be over two unknown parameters. For example: if we use p(s|o) = p(o|s)p(s)/p(o) to
rewrite the above expression as
maxp(s)I(S ;O) = maxp(s){H(S)−H(S|O)} = maxp(s)
∑
s
∑
o
[p(s)p(o|s)log p(o|s)/p(o)]
The above expression is still over two parameters p(s|o) and p(o).
Our goal is to estimate the channel capacity of the randomized protocol which would characterize
the maximum secrecy loss. For this we will need to estimate the above two distributions for a given
randomized protocol.
We choose to estimate p(s|o) and p(o|s) since
– estimating p(o) without the knowledge of p(s) (except that we know that this distribution p(s)
would maximize the mutual information) would be difficult.
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– the above expression can be easily shown to be convex in p(s|o) and p(s) and hence maximizing the
expression using these as parameters can be easily accomplished using gradient descent technique.
For cases, where the distribution p(s) which maximizes mutual information is known, the problem
would be limited to only finding p(o|s) since the joint probability distribution can be derived and the
marginals and conditionals computed thereof. In general, it is not possible to analytically find p(s) at
which the maximum would be attained.
3.3 Learning P (O|S)
Our approach towards learning the conditional distribution p(o|s) is to construct a Bayesian network
with nodes S ∪ O and edges from S to O. A Bayesian network is a probabilistic graphical model
that represents the probabilistic dependencies over a set of random variables. It is a graphical way to
represent the factorization of the join probability distribution such that for each node, only a conditional
probability table is maintained which gives the conditional probability of the random variable at that
node given the values of the random variables at the parents’ nodes. In this particular instance, for
each observable variable, it depends on one or more secret variables which would be the parent of the
observable variable. Efficient algorithms exist that perform inference and learning in Bayesian networks.
Since the protocol is only available to us as a black box implementation, we need to learn the edge
connectivity of the corresponding Bayesian network to find what secrets determine what observable
variables. This problem of learning structure of Bayesian networks from traces has been previously
studied in literature in context of learning genetic networks [14,21]. We adapt their approach to our
problem and summarize it here. A more detailed discussion of this technique is available in [14]. One
domain knowledge that we exploit is that the secret variables and the observable variables do not have
any intra-dependencies, that is, the observable variables are conditionally independent of each other
given the secret variables. This reduces the search space of possible structures of the Bayesian network.
The structure learning algorithm works by using the mutual information measures between the ob-
servable variables and the secret variables. The algorithm begins by identifying observable variables
which depend on only one secret variable. If the mutual information M(Oi, Sj) is same as H(Oi), then
clearly the observable variable Oi depends only on Sj and there is a single edge ending at Oi - the one
from Sj to Oi. After identifying all nodes which have single edge, the algorithm proceeds to identifying
observable variable nodes which depend on two secret nodes. The approach is similar - if the mutual
information content M(Oi, [Sj , Sk]) is same as the entropy H(Oi), then there are two edges ending at
Oi starting from Sj and Sk. The process is continued till the maximum bound on the number of edges
received as input. The algorithm is described below in Algorithm 1. Conservatively max-degree bound
can be specified to be the larger of the sizes of the secrets and observables.
Input: Max-degree d, Secrets S , Observables O and a set of traces T over these variables
Output: Mapping of observable to secrets
Or = O;
foreach observable Oj do
Calculate H(Oj) from T ;
end
foreach k in 1 to d do
foreach observable Oj ∈ Or do
foreach k-size candidate subset Sc of S do
Calculate M(Sc, Oj) from T ; if M(Sc, Oj) = H(Oj) then
Remove Oj from Or; Record edge from all Si ∈ Sc to Oj ;
end
end
end
Increment k;
end
assert(Or is empty);
Algorithm 1: Bayesian Network Structure Learning Algorithm
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Once the Bayesian structure has been learnt, the conditional probability values for each observable
variable is learnt using maximum likelihood estimates (MLE) [12,11]. Let θ denote the unknown pa-
rameter of the conditional probability distribution, then the maximum likelihood estimate of θ would
be given by argmaxθP (T |θ). An unbiased estimator for MLE is the frequency count.
3.4 Estimating P (S|O) for mutual information
The second parameter that we need to learn in order to compute the mutual information is P (S|O). We
present two approaches to compute this probability distribution. First, we consider a special case where
the conditional probability distribution is symmetric and then, we show a more general approach to
this problem. The special case was used in probabilistic model checking approach [5]. The more general
case is used in coding theory to infer correct codes from wrong codes.
Exploiting row symmetry of P (O|S) We consider the particular case in which the rows
of P (O|S) are permutations of each other. In this particular case,
I(S ;O) = H(O)H(O|S) where H(O|S) =
∑
s
p(s)H(O|S = s).
By row symmetry H(O|S = s) = H(O|S = s′) = H(Os) for all s, s
′.
Thus, I(S ;O) = H(O)−H(Os)
So, in this special case, P (S|O) need not be explicitly calculated and mutual information can be directly
computed using the symmetry.
Inference using gradient descent In general case, we need to use gradient descent techniques
to compute the channel capacity by maximizing the mutual information over p(S). An example of such a
technique is Arimoto-Blahut (AB) algorithm. A detailed discussion of this algorithm and its extensions
is presented in [19]. It is essentially a Bayesian approach where parameter is itself treated as a random
variable. The unknown distribution parameters for the conditional probability p(S|O) and p(S) are
treated as two different random variables (co-ordinates) over which the maximum needs to be attained.
AB algorithm is an iterative technique with the following update rules -
– pi+1(s|o) = pi(s)p(o|s)/
∑
s
pi(s)p(o|s)
– pi+1(s) = (
∏
o
pi+1(s|o)p(o|s))/[
∑
s
(
∏
o
pi+1(s|o)p(o|s))]
Since the mutual information expression is convex in both the parameters, the above iterative algorithm
would eventually terminate with the correct answer that would correspond to maximum over possible
p(S) and hence, is the channel capacity of the randomized protocol.
4 Experiments and Results
We validated our statistical technique by comparing it with probabilistic model checking on two ex-
amples - dining crypographer’s protocol and crowds protocol. These particular examples were chosen
because their PRISM [13] models (MDPs) are available from the PRISM tool website 2.
4.1 Dining Cryptographer
Some k number of cryptographers are dining . Either one of them or the host will pay the bill. They
have agreed not to find out who pays the bill in case the bill was paid by one of the cryptographers.
They only want to find out whether the host paid the bill or one of the cryptographers did. They each
toss a coin and if their coin matches with the one on their left, they say 1 if they are paying and 0 if they
are not. If the coins don’t match they say 0 if they are paying and 1 if they are not. If no cryptographer
paid, final exclusive or of their announcements would be (a1 ⊕ a2) ⊕ . . . (ai ⊕ ai+1) . . . (ak ⊕ a1) zero.
If a cryptographer paid: final exclusive or will yield 1. Thus, this protocol provides a channel to allow
announcement from a sender while maintaining his anonymity. But this secrecy guarantee relies on the
2 http://www.prismmodelchecker.org/
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fairness of the coin used by the cryptographers. An attacker can bias the coins used by cryptographers
and then try to learn which cryptographer paid.
We conducted 3 different set of experiments with k = 3, 4, 5 for the above protocol. In each set of
experiment, we considered the coins with heads probability varying from 0.0 to 1.0 in increments of
0.1. We estimated the channel capacity for the protocol using probabilistic model checking and our
technique. The corresponding plots are presented in Figure 2. The plot shows the channel capacity
estimated using probabilistic model checking as a continuous line while the statistically inferred data
is shown as points. The plot shows that for this case study, the statistical estimates are very close to
real values of channel capacity.
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(c) k=5
Fig. 2. Dining Cryptographers with varying number of cryptographers (k)
The channel capacity is observed to be minimum, that is 0, when fair coin is used by the cryptographers.
This corresponds to the strong anonymity guarantees of the protocol if it is implemented using a fair
coin. As the coin is made unfair, channel capacity rises and attains its maximum value which is close
to log of the number of cryptographers when the coin is completely biased.
4.2 Crowds Protocol
Crowds: This is meant to ensure that a message is transmitted from source to destination without
revealing the identity of the source. Initiator randomly selects a node to send it message. Each forward-
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ing node, with some fixed probability delivers message to destination or sends to some other randomly
selected node. Let some nodes be dishonest. They do not forward their messages and record the node
which came before them in the path. As paths are rebuilt, the corrupt nodes will very likely see the
sender node as predecessor more often than other nodes. Plots in Figure 3 and Figure 4 assume that
the attacker is on the path from original source to destination.
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(b) 2 Corrupt nodes
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(c) 5 Corrupt nodes
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Fig. 3. Crowds Protocol with 10 honest nodes
We consider two different sets of experiments - the first set with 10 honest nodes and varying number of
dishonest nodes (1,2,5,10) and the second set with 100 honest nodes and varying number of dishonest
nodes (10,20,50 and 100). We plot the forwarding probability with the mutual information. While our
statistical estimates are close to the values computed by probabilistic model checking for the smaller
crowds, the variation increases for larger crowds illustrating that sampling was not uniform.
The plots show that the maximum information is obtained when the forwarding probability is minimum.
The maximum information correspond to base 2 logarithm of the total number of honest nodes in the
crowd, that is, all the identities are revealed.
5 Limitations
We identify some key weaknesses of our approach.
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Fig. 4. Crowds Protocol with 100 honest nodes
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1. We need to evaluate our technique on non-symmetric protocols. Currently AB algorithm is not
implemented and hence, we can only work with symmetric protocols.
2. We assume that the source of randomization is of the same quality during testing and deployment.
Most errors in implementations of security protocol arise due to poor randomization in deployment.
3. In cases, where we can identify that anonymity guarantees provided by an implementation is not
sufficient, we do not provide any information regarding what was wrong with the implementation.
In contrast, probabilistic model checking can localize errors in a protocol.
4. Unlike formal techniques which provide guarantees about their correctness, our statistical approach
lacks any guarantee. It relies heavily on randomized sampling of the traces of the implementation.
6 Conclusion and Future Work
The statistical approach to analyze security protocols seems promising. We plan to compare our tech-
nique more extensively with probabilistic model checking as well as other techniques to analyze ran-
domized protocols. We identify some directions in which further work can be done on this project
-
1. Implementations can be partially observable and hence, we can use more than just the secret and
observable variables in our traces for more involved protocols.
2. This technique is not limited to security protocols and can also be extended to quantify the infor-
mation flow in a program.
3. This analysis technique can be used to identify protocol parameters for some intended degree of
secrecy. For example: how many nodes in a crowd should be corrupt such that the protocol is
exactly k-anonymous.
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